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4
 Panpsychism and Priority 
Cosmopsychism
Yu j in  Nagasawa  and  Kha i Wager
4.1 Introduction
A contemporary form of panpsychism says that phenomenality is prevalent 
because all physical ultimates instantiate phenomenal or protophenom-
enal properties. According to priority cosmopsychism, an alternative to 
panpsychism that we propose in this chapter, phenomenality is prevalent 
because the whole cosmos instantiates phenomenal or protophenomenal 
properties. It says, moreover, that the consciousness of the cosmos is on-
tologically prior to the consciousness of ordinary individuals like us. Since 
priority cosmopsychism is a highly speculative view our aim in this chapter 
remains modest and limited. Instead of providing a full defense of priority 
cosmopsychism, we try to show only the theoretical advantage of the view 
over panpsychism. This, however, by no means entails that we develop the 
view in logical space merely for its own sake. We offer instead a blueprint for 
a new alternative to panpsychism and explain how such a view avoids some 
of the most persistent problems for panpsychism while maintaining several 
of its strengths.1
This chapter has the following structure. In section 4.2, we discuss panpsy-
chism and priority monism, which are relevant to priority cosmopsychism. In 
section 4.3, we introduce priority cosmopsychism. In section 4.4, we show that 
priority cosmopsychism overcomes the main difficulties for panpsychism, in-
cluding the problem of infinite decomposition and the combination problem. 
In section 4.5, we defend priority cosmopsychism against possible objections. 
Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 Panpsychism and Priority Monism
Priority cosmopsychism is structurally parallel to both panpsychism and pri-
ority monism. We therefore address each of these views before formulating 
priority cosmopsychism.
4.2.1 Panpsychism
Since the present volume is devoted to panpsychism, we will not provide a 
comprehensive overview of panpsychism here. Nevertheless, some essential 
preliminaries are in order. The most straightforward version of panpsychism 
is formulated in terms of ordinary mental states. It says that everything has 
mental states in the same sense as we do— for example, rocks have thoughts 
to the same extent that we do. This is highly implausible. Contemporary pan-
psychism is, on the other hand, typically formulated in terms of phenomenal 
or protophenomenal properties instead of all types of mental states. There 
are many contemporary formulations, but in this chapter we focus on Philip 
Goff ’s formulation as follows (see Goff 2009, 294):
Panpsychism:  All physical ultimates instantiate phenomenal 
properties.
As Goff notes, this view is closely related to the following view:
Micropsychism:  Some physical ultimates instantiate phenomenal 
properties.
Panpsychism is an extreme form of micropsychism because it says that all, not 
merely some, physical ultimates instantiate phenomenal properties. That is 
why the view is called panpsychism.
Some formulate panpsychism in terms of protophenomenal properties in-
stead of phenomenal properties. They say that some physical ultimates instan-
tiate protophenomenal, rather than phenomenal, properties. David Chalmers 
addresses the distinction between the phenomenal and protophenomenal ver-
sions of panpsychism:2
There are two ways this might go. Perhaps we might take [phenom-
enal] experience itself as a fundamental feature of the world, along-
side space- time, spin, charge and the like. That is, certain phenom-
enal properties will have to be taken as basic properties. Alternatively, 
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perhaps there is some other class of novel fundamental properties 
from which phenomenal properties are derived… . [T] hese cannot 
be physical properties, but perhaps they are nonphysical properties 
of a new variety, on which phenomenal properties are logically super-
venient. Such properties would be related to experience in the same 
way that basic physical properties are related to nonbasic properties 
such as temperature. We could call these properties protophenomenal 
properties, as they are not themselves phenomenal but together they 
can yield the phenomenal. (Chalmers 1996, 126– 27)
The main reason for holding panpsychism is that it avoids the problem of strong 
emergence. This problem arises from the unexpectedness of phenomenal 
properties: phenomenal properties are instantiated by physical entities such as 
aggregates of neurons, but this is unexpected and surprising because neurons 
seem to be fundamentally nonexperiential. It seems impossible to explain how 
something experiential can be instantiated by something fundamentally non-
experiential. According to Galen Strawson, the instantiation of experiential 
phenomena by wholly nonexperiential phenomena is as extraordinary as the 
instantiation of spatial phenomena by nonspatial phenomena. He contends 
that such emergences are impossible because the following is true: For any fea-
ture Y of anything that is correctly considered to be emergent from X, there 
must be something about X and X alone in virtue of which Y emerges, and 
which is sufficient for Y. Strong emergence violates such a law and, hence, it is, 
“by definition, a miracle every time it occurs” (Strawson 2008, 64– 65).
Panpsychism avoids the problem of strong emergence by stipulating that 
physical ultimates are themselves phenomenal or protophenomenal. That is, 
according to panpsychism, it is not surprising that phenomenal properties 
are instantiated by aggregates of neurons because physical ultimates, which 
constitute neurons and other physical entities, are already phenomenal or 
protophenomenal.
4.2.2 Priority Monism
Priority monism says that exactly one basic concrete object, that is, the 
cosmos, exists (see Schaffer 2008). Priority monism should be distinguished 
from existence monism, according to which exactly one concrete object, that 
is, the cosmos, exists.3 Unlike existence monism, priority monism is compat-
ible with the existence of multiple concrete objects because it says only that 
there is exactly one basic concrete object. According to priority monism, the 
cosmos is more basic than other concrete objects in the sense that it is onto-
logically prior to, or ontologically more fundamental than, those other objects. 
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In other words, all concrete objects, except the cosmos itself, are derivative of 
the cosmos.
Priority monism appears counterintuitive initially because in most in-
stances we think that a whole is not ontologically prior to its parts. We think, 
for example, that the grains of sand constituting a heap are prior to the heap 
or that tiles in a mosaic are prior to the mosaic. Jonathan Schaffer points out, 
however, that there are many other examples in which we think that a whole 
is, in fact, prior to its parts. For instance, we think that a circle is prior to semi-
circles of the circle or that a body is prior to organs of the body (see Schaffer 
2008). This is because, according to Schaffer, our common sense distinguishes 
between mere heaps and genuine unities. A heap of grains of sand and a mosaic 
are mere heaps but a circle, a body, and the cosmos are, according to Schaffer, 
genuine unities.
Schaffer notes that priority monism is concerned with concrete objects and 
excludes everything else. He writes:
I assume that there is a maximal actual concrete object— the cosmos— 
of which all actual concrete objects are parts. I should emphasize that 
I am only concerned with actual concrete objects. Possibilia, abstracta, 
and actual concreta in categories other than object are not my concern 
(deities and spirits, if such there be, are not my concern either). When 
I speak of the world— and defend the monistic thesis that the whole is 
prior to its parts— I am speaking of the material cosmos and its plan-
ets, pebbles, particles, and other proper parts. (Schaffer 2010, 33)
Phenomenal properties are not within the scope of priority monism as they 
are not concrete objects.
4.3 Priority Cosmopsychism
We are now ready to formulate priority cosmopsychism. Again, priority cos-
mopsychism is structurally parallel to both panpsychism and priority monism.
Consider, first, the parallel structure between priority monism and priority 
cosmopsychism. Priority monism says that exactly one basic concrete object, 
the cosmos, exists. In parallel to this, priority cosmopsychism says that exactly 
one basic consciousness, the cosmic consciousness, exists. Recall that priority 
monism is concerned only with concrete objects. Priority cosmopsychism is, 
on the other hand, concerned only with phenomenal and protophenomenal 
properties, which fall outside the scope of priority monism. Priority cosmo-
psychism should be distinguished from existence cosmopsychism, according 
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to which exactly one consciousness, the cosmic consciousness, exists. Unlike 
existence cosmopsychism, priority cosmopsychism is compatible with the ex-
istence of multiple individual consciousnesses because it says only that there 
is exactly one basic consciousness. The cosmic consciousness is more basic 
than other consciousnesses in the sense that it is ontologically prior to or 
ontologically more fundamental than other consciousnesses. All conscious-
nesses except the cosmic consciousness itself are derivative of the cosmic con-
sciousness, in a manner similar to that in which all concrete objects except the 
cosmos itself are, according to priority monism, derivative of the cosmos.
Consider now the parallel structure between panpsychism and priority 
cosmopsychism. Panpsychism says, again, that all physical ultimates— that is, 
physical entities on the bottom level of reality— instantiate phenomenal prop-
erties. In parallel to this, priority cosmopsychism says that the cosmos, which 
is on the top level of reality, instantiates phenomenal properties. Panpsychism 
claims that phenomenal properties that physical ultimates instantiate are more 
fundamental than phenomenal properties of ordinary individuals. In fact, ac-
cording to panpsychism, phenomenal properties of physical ultimates are the 
most fundamental form of phenomenality. In parallel to this claim, priority 
cosmopsychism says that phenomenal properties which the cosmos instanti-
ates are more fundamental than phenomenal properties of ordinary individu-
als. In fact, according to priority cosmopsychism, the cosmic consciousness is 
the most fundamental form of phenomenality.
It is interesting to note that the combination of priority monism and (prior-
ity) cosmopsychism entails a unique version of panpsychism. Recall the formu-
lation of panpsychism we adopt in this chapter: all physical ultimates instan-
tiate phenomenal properties. Priority monism says that the phrase ‘physical 
ultimates’ in the formulation refers to a single entity, the cosmos, and (priority) 
cosmopsychism says that the cosmos instantiates phenomenal properties. This 
means that the combination of priority monism and (priority) cosmopsychism 
entails that the physical ultimate instantiates phenomenal properties, which is 
exactly what panpsychism says. In this chapter, however, in order to avoid con-
fusion, by the term ‘physical ultimates’ we mean fundamental physical entities 
on the bottom level of reality, rather than the cosmos. Also, we remain neutral 
about the compatibility of priority monism with (priority) cosmopsychism 
because priority cosmopsychism does not rely on priority monism (and vice 
versa). We also remain neutral about the nature of the cosmic consciousness. 
Some pantheists or panentheists might think that the cosmic consciousness is 
the consciousness of a higher being, such as God, which shares phenomenal 
experiences of individual conscious beings. Some others might think that the 
cosmic consciousness is not in itself phenomenal but only protophenomenal. 
However, these issues are not crucial to our discussion.
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4.4 Priority Cosmopsychism   
Versus Panpsychism
Why should we consider priority cosmopsychism as a serious alternative to 
panpsychism? First, like panpsychism, priority cosmopsychism is not vulner-
able to the problem of strong emergence. This is because priority cosmopsy-
chism rejects the claim that something experiential can be instantiated by 
something fundamentally nonexperiential. Second, more importantly, prior-
ity cosmopsychism avoids some of the most persistent problems for panpsy-
chism albeit that priority cosmopsychism is structurally parallel to panpsy-
chism. In this section, we consider two such problems, the problem of infinite 
decomposition and the combination problem.
4.4.1 The Problem of Infinite Decomposition
Again, panpsychism holds that all physical ultimates instantiate phenom-
enal properties. This means that panpsychism presupposes fundamentalism. 
Fundamentalism identifies entities on the bottom, fundamental level as ulti-
mate reality.4 Consider, for instance, physicalism as a version of fundamental-
ism. According to one form of physicalism, the ultimate level of reality is physi-
cal because, roughly speaking, microphysical theory describes the properties 
and behaviors of fundamental subatomic particles, on which everything else in 
the actual world supervenes. This means that entities on the fundamental level 
are entirely physical and, hence, everything in the actual world is ultimately 
physical. Panpsychism, at least the version that we have been considering here, 
adds to this form of physicalism that the fundamental subatomic particles, that 
is, physical ultimates, instantiate phenomenal properties.
Schaffer (2003) and Montero (2006) consider the argument that physical-
ism is false because fundamentalism is false. According to this argument, since 
the cosmos is stratified infinitely into levels, physicalism cannot be true. They 
are right in thinking that, insofar as physicalism is formulated as a version of 
fundamentalism, the falsity of fundamentalism entails the falsity of physical-
ism. However, the falsity of fundamentalism also entails the falsity of panpsy-
chism because, again, panpsychism presupposes fundamentalism.
Schaffer tries to show that it is at least possible that the cosmos is stratified 
infinitely into levels by appealing to the conceivability and logical consistency 
of infinite decomposition (see Schaffer 2003, 501). First, he says, infinite de-
composition is metaphysically possible because it is conceivable that every-
thing has parts. It is conceivable that everything is extended and everything 
that is extended is decomposed into further entities. If conceivability entails 
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possibility, then it is possible that everything has parts. Second, he says, infi-
nite decomposition is metaphysically possible because it is logically consistent. 
There are consistent models of mereology that allow infinite decomposition. 
Given that there are such consistent models, there is no a priori ground for re-
jecting the possibility of infinite decomposition as a metaphysical possibility. 
Schaffer contends, moreover, that infinite decomposition might be not only 
possible but also actual because it is taken seriously by scientists. For example, 
the quantum physicist David Bohm (1957) says that his formulation of physics 
is “consistent with an infinity of levels.” To take another example, the physicist 
Hans Dehmelt (1989) postulates an infinite regression of subelectron struc-
ture. So it appears that while it remains inconclusive whether the lack of physi-
cal ultimates is actually true, it should be taken seriously.
Again, if fundamentalism is false and there are no physical ultimates, then 
panpsychism is false. In such a case, contrary to what panpsychism says, there 
are no physical ultimates to instantiate phenomenal properties. One might 
suggest at this point that if there are no physical ultimates, then panpsychism 
can be defined as a thesis that certain microphysical entities, but not physical 
ultimates, instantiate phenomenal properties. However, such a view is arbi-
trary. It is unclear why certain microphysical entities on a certain level of real-
ity instantiate phenomenal properties while others on lower levels do not. The 
possibility of infinite decomposition therefore threatens panpsychism.
Priority cosmopsychism, however, is not vulnerable to the problem of in-
finite decomposition. This is because priority cosmopsychism does not rely 
on fundamentalism. More specifically, it attributes basic consciousness to 
the cosmos, which is on the top level of reality, rather than physical ultimates, 
which, if they exist, are on the bottom level. Whether there is a bottom level, 
therefore, is irrelevant to the cogency of priority cosmopsychism. As long as 
the cosmos exists, priority cosmopsychism is intact, and indeed the cosmos 
does exist. These observations give us a reason to prefer priority cosmopsy-
chism to panpsychism.
We have considered the possibility of infinite decomposition of concrete 
objects, but we might extend this idea to phenomenal properties as well. 
Chalmers, for example, seems to think that phenomenal properties are prop-
erly arranged sums of protophenomenal properties when he says that phe-
nomenal properties logically supervene on protophenomenal properties (see 
Chalmers 1996, 126). If that is true, it might be the case that phenomenal 
properties are infinitely decomposable into more and more primitive forms of 
protophenomenal properties and that the chain of decomposition or superve-
nience continues infinitely. Such a possibility would also undermine panpsy-
chism because the whole point of panpsychism is to introduce phenomenal or 
protophenomenal properties as fundamental building blocks of phenomenal 
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reality on the bottom level so that the existence of consciousness does not 
entail strong emergence. If phenomenal properties are infinitely decompos-
able they cannot be fundamental building blocks.
Priority cosmopsychism is not threatened by the possibility of infinite de-
composition of phenomenal properties either, because, again, priority cosmo-
psychism regards the cosmic consciousness as ontologically prior to ‘smaller’ 
forms of consciousness, so whether there are ‘smallest’ forms of phenom-
enal or protophenomenal properties is irrelevant to the cogency of priority 
cosmopsychism.5
4.4.2 The Combination Problem
The combination problem arises from the apparent discrepancy between 
a highly complex, structured aggregate of atoms and brain cells, on the one 
hand; and a smooth, uniform phenomenal experience such as a visual expe-
rience, on the other. The problem can be formulated as an objection to pan-
psychism as follows: Ordinary phenomenal experiences present themselves as 
smooth, continuous, and unified. They do have distinct aspects, but they have 
an underlying homogeneity. According to panpsychism, however, all physical 
ultimates instantiate phenomenal or protophenomenal properties and our or-
dinary phenomenal experiences result from combinations of these properties. 
It is hard to see, however, how phenomenal or protophenomenal properties of 
microphysical entities could add up to the homogeneous character of phenom-
enal experiences that we have.
The combination problem is arguably the most difficult problem for panpsy-
chism. Chalmers, for example, writes, “It is certainly the hardest problem for 
any sort of Russellian view” (which includes a version of panpsychism we con-
sider here; Chalmers 1996, 307). William Seager also regards it as “the most 
difficult problem facing any panpsychist theory of consciousness” (Seager 
1995, 280). Priority cosmopsychism, however, does not face the combination 
problem because, unlike panpsychism, it denies that phenomenal experiences 
are constituted by phenomenal properties of physical ultimates.6 Again, prior-
ity cosmopsychism attributes basic consciousness to the cosmos and regards 
individual consciousnesses as derivatives of it. That is, contrary to what pan-
psychism says, priority cosmopsychism regards phenomenal experiences as 
derivatives of something ‘larger’ (i.e., the cosmic consciousness) rather than 
as the aggregate of something ‘smaller’ (i.e., phenomenal or protophenomenal 
properties of physical ultimates). In other words, panpsychism faces the com-
bination problem because it is a bottom- up view— it starts with phenomenal 
properties or protophenomenal properties of physical ultimates and tries to 
build ordinary phenomenal properties from them. Priority cosmopsychism, 
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on the other hand, is a top- down view— it starts with the cosmic conscious-
ness and tries to derive ordinary phenomenal properties from it. Here is an 
analogy to illustrate this point. Suppose, per impossibile, there is an absolutely 
perfectly smooth painting, which is analogous to a smooth, homogeneous 
phenomenal experience. Such a painting cannot be an aggregate of small dots, 
which are analogous to phenomenal or protophenomenal properties of physi-
cal ultimates, but it can be a segment of a larger painting that is equally smooth 
and homogeneous, which is analogous to the cosmic consciousness.
One might point out here that while priority cosmopsychism avoids the 
combination problem it does seem to face a problem of the same structure on 
a larger scale. The combination problem asks how medium- size conscious-
nesses can be built from minute phenomenal or protophenomenal properties 
of physical ultimates. Similarly, the problem in question asks how the cosmic 
consciousness can be built from medium- size individual consciousnesses.
Fortunately, this is not a serious problem because it is based on a misin-
terpretation of priority cosmopsychism. Priority cosmopsychism says that 
medium- size individual consciousnesses are derivatives of the cosmic con-
sciousness but that does not entail that medium- size individual conscious-
nesses constitute the cosmic consciousness as ontologically prior building 
blocks of the cosmic consciousness. On the contrary, according to priority 
cosmopsychism, the cosmic consciousness is ontologically prior to medium- 
size individual consciousnesses.
One might claim, however, that priority cosmopsychism still fails to pro-
vide an answer to the following crucial question: How could medium- size in-
dividual consciousnesses be derived from the cosmic consciousness? Let us 
call this problem the ‘derivation problem.’ It is not easy to provide an answer to 
the derivation problem because we do not know the exact nature of the cosmic 
consciousness. Yet we can speculate how we might be able to respond to the 
problem.
It is reasonable to assume that the cosmic consciousness is somewhat com-
parable to the consciousness of an ordinary individual because, after all, it is a 
form of consciousness. If we can then show that the consciousness of an ordi-
nary individual can be divided into smaller, less fundamental segments, then 
we have reason to think that the cosmic consciousness can also be divided into 
smaller, less fundamental segments. And it seems indeed possible to divide the 
consciousness of an ordinary individual into smaller segments.
Consider, for example, a visual experience. A  visual experience can be 
considered to be a unity which may be segmented into distinguishable color 
experiences (e.g., experiences corresponding to red and green hues) or expe-
riences of separable regions in space (e.g., experiences corresponding to the 
right- hand side and the left- hand side of the visual field). Yet the whole visual 
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experience is considered to be a unity that is more fundamental than the seg-
ments. Perhaps the cosmic consciousness unifies individual consciousnesses 
in a similar way. The cosmic consciousness is more fundamental than indi-
vidual consciousness, so it is not the case that individual consciousnesses are 
fundamental building blocks of the cosmic consciousness. On the contrary, 
smooth, continuous and unified individual consciousnesses are derived from 
the smooth, continuous and unified cosmic consciousness.
It may be useful to recall, here, that priority cosmopsychism shares a paral-
lel structure with priority monism. Priority monism states that the concrete 
cosmos, as an integrated whole, is the only basic concrete object and other 
ordinary concrete objects are derived from it. Priority cosmopsychism states 
that the cosmic consciousness, as an integrated whole, is the only basic form of 
consciousness and ordinary consciousnesses are derived from it. As a result of 
this parallel structure, just as priority cosmopsychism has to address the deri-
vation problem, so too priority monism has to address its own equivalent of 
the derivation problem. In the case of priority monism, the derivation problem 
can be stated as the problem of how the many concrete parts of the cosmos are 
derived from the basic concrete whole.
Schaffer (2010, 57) offers a number of possible solutions to the derivation 
problem for priority monism and the same responses can be adapted to answer 
the derivation problem for priority cosmopsychism. As such, priority cosmo-
psychism can offer accounts of how the derivation problem might be resolved.
Recall that for priority monism the derivation problem is the problem of 
accounting for the derivative parts in terms of the basic cosmos. Schaffer 
addresses the problem in terms of heterogeneity. It is typically an uncontro-
versial premise that the basic feature(s) of the cosmos must be homogenous. 
According to priority monism the cosmos itself is the only basic feature, yet 
it claims that the cosmos is also heterogeneous because it contains derivative 
parts. Schaffer offers three different options for explaining the heterogeneity 
of the cosmos whilst still allowing that it is, as an integrated whole, basic. He 
also notes that any view positing basic features needs to account for their being 
heterogeneous as opposed to homogenous (see Schaffer 2010). The three ac-
counts of the heterogeneity of the cosmos are given with respect to firstly, dis-
tributional properties, secondly, regionalized properties, and finally, regional-
ized instantiation.
On the first account the cosmos, as an integrated whole, is heterogeneous 
due to instantiating distributional properties,
For the monist, the general fact that the world is heterogeneous is due 
to the world’s instantiating the determinable property of being het-
erogeneous. The specific way that the world is heterogeneous is due 
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to the world’s instantiating the determinate property of tracing such- 
and- such a curve through physical configuration space. Thus the one 
whole can be parturient. (Schaffer 2010, 260)
On the second account, the cosmos is heterogeneous due to regionalized prop-
erties. The cosmos has the monadic property of being the cosmos, yet it bears 
a relation of, say, spikiness to one region and flatness to another. The third ac-
count also makes use of regionalization but instead appeals to regionalized 
instantiation, where the cosmos is heterogeneous due to it, say, instantiating- 
here spiky and instantiating- there flat.
There are differing views regarding the three accounts, but the important 
thing is that they are consistent ways to make the move from, in concrete 
terms, a cosmos that is a basic integrated whole to a derivative heterogeneity. 
As a result of priority cosmopsychism sharing a parallel structure with priority 
monism, we might adopt these strategies in response to the derivation prob-
lem for priority cosmopsychism. A version of all three accounts could be given 
to explain the heterogeneity of the cosmic consciousness.
In parallel to the first response, priority cosmopsychists might say that the 
cosmic consciousness is heterogeneous due to it instantiating the determin-
able property of being heterogeneous. According to this response the cosmic 
consciousness would instantiate the distributive property of following a par-
ticular path through phenomenal configuration space (no doubt an extremely 
complex path through a configuration space of many dimensions). In paral-
lel to the second response, priority cosmopsychists might say that the cosmic 
consciousness is heterogeneous due to regionalized properties, where the 
cosmic consciousness is a monadic property which bears a relation of redness 
to one region and blueness to another region. The monadic property of being 
the cosmic consciousness would demonstrate many relations among regional-
ized phenomenal properties. Finally, in parallel to the third response, priority 
cosmopsychists might say that the cosmic consciousness is heterogeneous due 
to regionalized instantiation of phenomenal properties, the cosmic conscious-
ness instantiates- here red and instantiates- there blue. A thorough exploration 
of such possibilities is not within bounds of the present chapter but will make 
for interesting future work.
Let us recap. Panpsychism faces the infinite decomposability problem be-
cause it relies on fundamentalism. Priority cosmopsychism, on the other hand, 
does not face that problem as it is free from fundamentalism. Panpsychism 
also faces the combination problem, which is recognized as the strongest ob-
jection to the view. Priority cosmopsychism, on the other hand, offers a satis-
factory answer to this problem. Instead of the combination problem, however, 
priority cosmopsychism faces the derivation problem. Yet, as we have seen, 
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there are prima facie reasons to think that it can be resolved. Therefore, prior-
ity cosmopsychism seems more attractive than panpsychism.
4.5 Objections to Priority Cosmopsychism
We have seen that priority cosmopsychism overcomes some of the most 
persistent problems associated with panpsychism. One might argue, 
however, that priority cosmopsychism still seems more implausible than 
panpsychism. In this section, we review some objections to priority 
cosmopsychism.
4.5.1 Inexplicability of the Cosmic Consciousness
One might reject priority cosmopsychism by saying that it is silent about ex-
actly what the cosmic consciousness is. The attribution of phenomenality to the 
cosmos is essential for priority cosmopsychism, so without explaining what the 
cosmic consciousness is, one might say, priority cosmopsychism is incomplete.
Priority cosmopsychism is not completely silent about the nature of the 
cosmic consciousness. It says, for example, that the cosmic consciousness is 
ontologically the most fundamental form of consciousness of which the con-
sciousnesses of ordinary individuals are derivative. We can also speculate 
about further possibilities. For example, we might think that since the cosmos 
on the whole is not complex enough in a relevant sense to instantiate phenome-
nality to the fullest extent there is no such thing as the phenomenal self for the 
cosmic consciousness. Perhaps the cosmic consciousness is an organic unity 
of phenomenal and protophenomenal forms of conscious experiences. Recall 
again however that our purpose here is not to offer a full defense of priority 
cosmopsychism but only to show that priority cosmopsychism is more attrac-
tive than panpsychism insofar as it avoids some of the most persistent prob-
lems for panpsychism. If panpsychism does not say much about the nature of 
the consciousness of physical ultimates, priority cosmopsychism is not com-
mitted to saying much about the nature of the cosmic consciousness either. 
And, in fact, panpsychism says very little about the consciousness of physical 
ultimates. Chalmers, for example, writes, “Of course it is very hard to imag-
ine what a protophenomenal property [which a physical ultimate instantiates] 
could be like but we cannot rule out the possibility that they exist” (Chalmers 
1996, 127). We can make a parallel claim here: Of course it is very hard to 
imagine what the cosmic consciousness could be like but we cannot rule out 
the possibility that it exists. And, again, there are reasons to prefer priority 
cosmopsychism to panpsychism.
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4.5.2 Counterintuitiveness
Priority cosmopsychism attributes consciousness to the cosmos, which seems 
highly counterintuitive. One might wonder how we could take such a counter-
intuitive thesis seriously.
Recall, once again, that we are comparing only the plausibility of priority 
cosmopsychism with that of panpsychism. So our interest here is to show only 
that priority cosmopsychism is no more counterintuitive than panpsychism. 
Panpsychism holds the fundamentalist view that there is a fundamental 
bottom level of reality and it adds that physical ultimates on the fundamen-
tal level instantiate phenomenal properties. Priority cosmopsychism, on the 
other hand, holds that the cosmos is on the top level of reality and adds that the 
cosmos instantiates phenomenal properties. Structurally speaking, therefore, 
they are parallel, and there seems no reason to think that either of them is dis-
tinctively more counterintuitive than the other.
One might claim, however, that the attribution of phenomenality to the 
cosmos is particularly absurd. The brain can instantiate phenomenal proper-
ties because it has the right structural complexity. Yet, one might continue, the 
cosmos is not comparable to the brain in terms of structural complexity.
While this might be a good argument to show that priority cosmopsychism 
is counterintuitive it is not a good argument to show that priority cosmopsy-
chism is more counterintuitive than panpsychism. This is because panpsy-
chism faces an objection of the exact same form: Physical ultimates do not 
have the structural complexity of the brain, so it is counterintuitive to think 
that they can instantiate phenomenal properties. (If structural complexity is 
really crucial it might be more implausible to say that physical ultimates have 
consciousness than that the cosmos does because they are structurally much 
less complex than the cosmos.)
Notice that panpsychism itself is often rejected on the ground that it is highly 
counterintuitive. John Searle, for example, calls panpsychism an “absurd view” 
and characterizes Chalmers’s defense of panpsychism as follows: “when faced 
with a reductio ad absurdum argument he just accepts the absurdity” (Searle 
1997, 156). It would be ironic if panpsychists were to dismiss priority cosmo-
psychism because of its counterintuitiveness when they emphasize that pan-
psychism should not be dismissed on the basis of its counterintuitiveness.
We can apply the same reasoning to many other objections to priority 
cosmopsychism. For example, one might say that priority cosmopsychism is 
absurd because there is no sign that the cosmos is conscious (the ‘no sign’ prob-
lem for priority cosmopsychism) or because there is no definitive empirical 
test to prove that the cosmos is conscious (the ‘no test’ problem for priority 
cosmopsychism). In response to the ‘no sign’ problem, one might say that there 
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is no sign because the cosmos is not structured in such a way that it behaves 
in accordance with the phenomenal or protophenomenal properties it has, 
unlike the way in which human bodies behave in accordance with the phe-
nomenal or protophenomenal properties humans have. In response to the ‘no 
test’ problem, one might point out that, to the extent that there is no definitive 
empirical test to prove that the cosmos has consciousness, there is similarly no 
definitive empirical test to prove that higher animals have consciousness. That 
is why the problem of animal minds (and other minds) is intractable. However, 
it is unnecessary to offer such philosophically substantial responses because 
these problems apply as much to panpsychism as to priority cosmopsychism. 
There is no sign that physical ultimates are conscious (the ‘no sign’ problem 
for panpsychism) and there is no definitive empirical test to prove that physi-
cal ultimates are conscious (the ‘no test’ problem for panpsychism). Again, we 
are comparing only priority cosmopsychism and panpsychism. It is, there-
fore, sufficient to say that while these problems might be genuine challenges 
for priority cosmopsychism they apply equally to panpsychism. Hence, these 
problems do not make priority cosmopsychism any more implausible than 
panpsychism.
4.5.3 Estrangement from Current Science
It might be contended that priority cosmopsychism is not to be preferred since 
it is less compatible with features of current science than contemporary pan-
psychism is. It might be argued, for example, that priority cosmopsychism is 
an especially estranged view since it is not concerned with the same physical 
ultimates that are the focus of current physics. One might claim panpsychism 
is preferable on the grounds that it is concerned with the same physical ulti-
mates described by current physics, since it states that fundamental phenom-
enal, or protophenomenal, properties are associated in some sense with such 
ultimates.
One particular objection of this kind might be that priority cosmopsychism 
is unable to adhere to the causal closure of the microphysical. This is the prin-
ciple, which says that the causal efficacy of the world is fully accounted for in 
terms of the causal efficacy of the physical ultimates. One might claim that 
panpsychism can address the problem of causal closure but priority cosmo-
psychism cannot. Panpsychism might adhere to the principle by claiming that 
since all physical ultimates instantiate phenomenal properties any causal ef-
ficacy that they may have is already accounted for in current physics.
In response to such objections, we first note that the purpose of this chap-
ter is to defend a blueprint for a new alternative to panpsychism, here we do 
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not defend any specific view based on this blueprint. In this chapter we only 
address phenomenality and do not endorse a particular relation between 
phenomenal properties and physical properties. Since it is in such a relation 
that it will become clear if priority cosmopsychism can adhere to the causal 
closure of the microphysical, it is after developing a specific view based on 
the blueprint that one would be fully equipped to respond to this objection. 
However, it might be interesting to note that one possible development on the 
blueprint we offer here is a dual- aspect version of priority cosmopsychism, ac-
cording to which the phenomenal and the physical are co- extensive, with the 
respective properties at the level of the cosmos being basic. On such a view it 
might be considered more plausible for the priority cosmopsychist to follow 
the panpsychist in claiming that the principle of causal closure is adhered to 
on the grounds of the phenomenal already being accounted for in our current 
physics.
4.6 Conclusion
Panpsychism is an attractive view because, by attributing phenomenality to 
the fundamental nature of reality, it avoids the problem of strong emergence. 
However, on the other hand, panpsychism faces the infinite decomposition 
problem because it presupposes the existence of physical ultimates. It also 
faces the combination problem because it holds that phenomenal experiences 
are constituted by phenomenal or protophenomenal properties of physical ul-
timates. Priority cosmopsychism can be construed as a hypothesis designed 
to avoid these problems without compromising the promising approach to the 
problem of strong emergence suggested by panpsychism. Priority cosmopsy-
chism attributes the most fundamental form of consciousness to the cosmos, 
rather than physical ultimates, and holds that the consciousnesses of ordinary 
individuals are derivative of it. In this way, priority cosmopsychism avoids 
not only the problem of strong emergence but also the infinite decomposi-
tion problem and the combination problem. Since priority cosmopsychism 
and panpsychism are structurally parallel, priority cosmopsychism is no more 
implausible or counterintuitive than panpsychism. Therefore, we can con-
clude that priority cosmopsychism benefits from a theoretical advantage over 
panpsychism.
Again, what we have defended in this chapter is a blueprint for a new alter-
native to panpsychism. This blueprint may be used to develop more specific 
views, such as monistic, dualistic, or even pantheistic views based on priority 
cosmopsychism. We have to wait for another occasion to develop and assess 
such specific views.
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Notes
 1. An earlier version of this essay was presented at the “Minds: Human and Divine” confer-
ence in Munich in 2012. This conference was part of the Analytic Theology Project gra-
ciously funded by the John Templeton Foundation. We would like to thank all in the audi-
ences. We are particularly grateful to Godehard Brüntrup who organized the event. This 
essay was written as part of Nagasawa’s research project with Andrei Buckareff, “Exploring 
Alternative Concepts of God,” funded by the John Templeton Foundation. We thank the 
Foundation for its generous support.
 2. To be precise, in this passage Chalmers is talking about the phenomenal and protophenom-
enal versions of what he calls type- F monism, which subsumes some versions of panpsy-
chism. So his focus in the passage is more general than ours.
 3. For a discussion of existence monism see Horgan and Potrč 2000.
 4. As Barbara Montero (2006, 181) points out, fundamentalism can be formulated in many 
ways. For example, it can be formulated in terms of decomposition, in which case entities 
on the fundamental level are undecomposable proper parts (i.e., mereological atoms or 
simples) that constitute everything else on higher levels. To take another example, it could 
be formulated in terms of supervenience, in which case entities on the fundamental level are 
the bases on which all entities on higher levels supervene. It can also be formulated in terms 
of realization, explanation, reduction, determination, and so on. In this chapter, we focus 
on decomposition because that seems to be most intuitive. However, most of the claims 
that we make over the course of this paper apply equally to other formulations.
 5. Here we use the term ‘small’ metaphorically. Phenomenal properties are not concrete ob-
jects so, of course, they do not occupy physical space.
 6. Similar points are made by Ludwig Jaskolla and Alexander Buck (2012) and Freya Mathews 
(2011), but the cosmopsychist views to which they appeal are radically different from ours. 
Consider, first, Jaskolla and Buck’s ‘panexperientialist holism.’ Panexperiential holism 
presupposes existence monism, saying “there is exactly one entity— the universe itself ” 
(Jaskolla and Buck 2012, 196). Existence monism is a highly controversial thesis, on which 
our view, priority cosmopsychism, does not rely. Priority cosmopsychism does not even rely 
on priority monism, which is more modest than existence monism. Panexperiential holism 
also stipulates that the universe is “a subject of experience … exemplifying experiential con-
tent” (Jaskolla and Buck 2012, 196). Priority cosmopsychism does not make such a claim 
as it is a minimalist view that is parallel to panpsychism. Insofar as panpsychism does not 
assume that physical ultimates are subjects of experience exemplifying experiential content, 
priority cosmopsychism does not assume that the cosmos is a subject of experience exempli-
fying experiential content. Consider, second, Freya Mathews’s “cosmological panpsychism.” 
According to this view, “the One” is a subject that “may feel the effects of finite centres of sub-
jectivity in the field of its own larger subjectivity, even though it may not be able actually to 
experience the way such finite selves feel to themselves” (Mathews 2011, 149). Priority cos-
mopsychism is not committed to such a claim as, again, it does not assume that the cosmos 
is a subject of experience. Also, in explaining the nature of the consciousness of the One, 
Mathews appeals to an idea in psychoanalysis saying, “Amongst the unconscious compo-
nents of psyche are enduring constellations of psychophysical energy which never surface 
into ego consciousness yet which nevertheless may be active in the psychic life of a person” 
(Mathews 2011, 148). Again, priority cosmopsychism does not make such a claim.
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